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Abstract 
 
 
Viewed in the light of the theory of accidental excellence, there is much to 
suggest that the success of the Internet and its various protocols derives 
from a communications technology accident, or better, a series of accidents. 
In the early 1990s, many experts still saw the Internet as an academic toy 
that would soon vanish into thin air again. The Internet probably gained its 
reputation as an academic toy largely because it violated the basic principles 
of traditional communications networks. The quarrel about paradigms that 
erupted in the 1970s between the telephony world and the newly emerging 
Internet community was not, however, only about transmission technology 
doctrines. It was also about the question – still unresolved today – as to who 
actually governs the flow of information: the operators or the users of the 
network? The paper first describes various network architectures in relation 
to the communication cultures expressed in their make-up. It then examines 
the creative environment found at the nodes of the network, whose 
coincidental importance for the Internet boom must not be forgotten. Finally, 
the example of Usenet is taken to look at the kind of regulatory practices that 
have emerged in the communications services provided within the framework 
of a decentralised network architecture. 
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1. “f8 and be there”* 
 
It’s just the Internet.  
A million monkeys with typewriters could run it.  
Simon Higgs 
 
The Internet is home to a vast assortment of quotations and experimental 
designs concerning monkeys and typewriters. They all expand on the theory 
often attributed to Henri Poincaré which contends that if an infinite number of 
monkeys were left to bang on an infinite number of typewriters, sooner or 
later they would accidentally reproduce the complete works of William 
Shakespeare (or even just one of his sonnets).1 
 
So what, you might ask, do monkeys and typewriters, both of which might be 
seen as typical representatives of the pre-digital age, have to do with the 
Internet? And what, you might ask further, has prompted the authors of this 
essay to approach the question of the Internet from this rather 
unconventional perspective? Let us start with the second question: While this 
essay is the first we have written about the role of monkeys and typewriters 
on the Net, it is also the conclusion to a series of technical anthropology-
inspired contributions which the WZB’s “Cultural Space of the Internet” 
project group presented between 1994 and 1998 (Helmers, Hoffmann & 
Hofmann 2000). Seen through a technical anthropology-tinted pair of 
glasses, the Internet represents a homogeneous blend of technical and 
social rules which shape each other reciprocally. The digital code, daily 
routines, turns of phrase and moral value systems found on the Net are all 
bound together by a common cultural framework, and jokes are a revealing 
and thus certainly a valid source of information for its investigation. 
 
The first question might be answered by the theory of accidental excellence, 
which asserts that the creation of masterpieces is a matter of coincidence, or: 
“f8 and be there”.2 In other words, in order to create something original and 
great, the most important thing is to be prepared and in the right place at the 
right time. The observation about monkeys and typewriters illustrates this 
position in the form of a statistical (im)probability. 
                                                 
*  Also published in German as: Monkeys, Typewriters and Networks. Das Internet im Lichte der 
Theorie akzidentieller Exzellenz. In: Wo wären wir ohne die Verrückten? Zur Rolle von 
Außenseitern in Wissenschaft, Politik und Wirtschaft. Berthoin Antal, Ariane and Camilla 
Krebsbach-Gnath (eds.), Berlin: edition sigma 2001, pp. 119-140. 
1 Jim Reeds hosts one such collection at [http://www.research.att.com/~reeds/monkeys.html]. The 
poignant story of Doctor Adam Safran’s monkey-and-typewriter experiments (which failed twice) 
can be found at [http://www.100monkeys.org/history.shtml]. 
2 This figure of speech is, of course, mainly used by photographers. However, it may soon 
demonstrate its potential for generalisation in relation to the theory of accidental excellence. An 
initial discussion of its relevance to the topic can be found at 
[http://www.greenspun.com/bboard/q-and-a-fetch-msg.tcl?msg_id=0048t9]. 
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The founding fathers of the Internet are all too aware of the significance of 
chance in the development of the network and its services: “There's always 
an absolutely incomprehensible amalgam of luck, chance and a lot of good 
guesses. On average we are a lot luckier than we normally admit.” (M.D.)3 
 
“Monkeys with typewriters” jokes reveal themselves to be one of the ways the 
mathematically minded like to take an ironic look at their own work and its 
astounding effects. One of the most recent and also most detailed examples 
is a text entitled “The Infinite Monkey Protocol Suite (IMPS)”, which appeared 
as an informational Request for Comment (RFC 2795) by the Internet 
Society.4 In actual fact, viewed in the light of the theory of accidental 
excellence, there is much to suggest that the success of the Internet and its 
various protocols derives from a communications technology accident, or 
better, a series of accidents. 
 
In the early 1990s, many experts still saw the Internet as an academic toy 
that would soon vanish into thin air again. In fact, had the governments of 
Europe had their way, the TCP/IP Internet protocol (Transmission Control 
Protocol/Internet Protocol) would never have advanced beyond the status of 
clever toy. The protocol initially favoured in Europe was X.25 – a thoroughly 
paternalistic model of a public data network which had been inspired by the 
telephone system. X.25 foundered on the superior charm of a freely 
accessible Internet which was not controlled by any central authority. The 
Internet probably gained its reputation as an academic toy largely because it 
violated the basic principles of traditional communications networks. 
 
The quarrel about paradigms that erupted in the 1970s between the 
telephony world and the newly emerging Internet community was not, 
however, only about transmission technology doctrines. It was also about the 
question – still unresolved today – as to who actually governs the flow of 
information: the operators or the users of the network? The dispute between 
the Internet and the telephony communities about sovereignty over 
cyberspace was mainly carried out in the relevant standardisation 
committees. Far away from the public eye, the rival parties defended two 
divergent communications philosophies which in fact have massive political 
as well as practical implications for communication. 
 
In the following, we will first describe various network architectures in relation 
to the communication cultures expressed in their make-up. We will then 
                                                 
3 This and the following initialled quotes are taken from interviews the authors of this essay carried 
out with Internet and Usenet pioneers within the framework of the project entitled “The Internet as 
a space of interaction. Net culture and network organisation in open data networks”, which was 
sponsored by the Volkswagen Foundation. 
4 This RFC, published on 1 April 2000, describes a “protocol suite which supports an infinite 
number of monkeys that sit at an infinite number of typewriters in order to determine when they 
have either produced the entire work of William Shakespeare or a good television show.” (RFC 
2795) 
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examine the creative environment found at the nodes of the network, whose 
coincidental importance for the Internet boom must not be forgotten. Finally, 
we will take the example of Usenet to look at the kind of regulatory practices 
that have emerged in the communications services provided within the 
framework of a decentralised network architecture. 
2. The revolution against the telco circuit-switching empire  
 
“’Ford!', he said, 'there's an infinite number of 
monkeys outside who want to talk to us about 
this script for Hamlet they've worked out.'" 
Douglas Adams 
 
At the end of the 1960s, when the ARPANET, the forerunner of the Internet, 
was being put through its first test runs, in most countries the operation of 
communications networks was a job for the state, which national postal and 
telephone administrations were still largely left to carry out unchallenged. 
Sovereignty over advances in communications technology belonged to a 
Byzantine conglomerate of national and international standardisation 
organisations in which the former monopolies and the manufacturers, the so-
called “court purveyors” were organised. (Abbate 1999; Genschel 1995) 
 
Seen from today’s perspective, the postal authorities’ monopoly was 
incredibly far-reaching. In addition to the network and the transmission 
technology, it also covered the services provided and the equipment required 
by the users. We only need to remember the German Bundespost’s 
monopoly on modems, which seems completely absurd today, but was 
vigorously defended in the 1980s. (Werle 1990, pp. 307-308) The postal 
companies’ unrivalled power allowed them to model the architecture of the 
telephone networks on their own organisational structure. As a result, the 
structure of the technology was just as hierarchical as the companies 
operating it (Genschel 1995, p. 46). The professional cultures of the 
manufacturing and operating communities in each country ensured that the 
looking-glass relationship between networks and organisational structures 
persisted, despite the gradual technical transformation:  
 
“The telephony people had an electrical engineering background. They’d 
come up through the AT&T training program. (…) If you came up through 
AT&T hierarchy, it was indoctrination. By the time you’d been there 20 years, 
you knew how telecommunications networks were supposed to be built and 
that’s the way you built them.” (L.C.) 
 
The pioneers of the Internet lacked this “telephone mentality”. They had 
studied neither electrical nor communications engineering, nor had they been 
trained by the telephone companies. Hence, they did not know how to 
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construct communications networks. The Internet’s trailblazers came from 
the world of computer science. Their interest in networks came about 
because of a typical bottleneck encountered in the technology of the time. It 
was the solution to this problem that accidentally evolved into the idea behind 
the creation of the Internet: resource-sharing. In the late 1960s, computing 
capacity was an expensive and therefore scarce commodity. Time-sharing 
systems, which gave several users simultaneous access to a central 
processing unit, were introduced so that computers could be used as 
efficiently as possible. The principle of time-sharing allowed computers and 
terminals to be networked at local level. What was missing was a data 
network that enabled communication between computers across large 
geographical distances. While it was already possible in the 1960s to 
transmit modest amounts of data across the telephone network, the 
procedures available were slow, unreliable and expensive. 
 
Over the subsequent years, the academic principle of collective resource-
sharing became a formative leitmotif in the development of the Internet.5 The 
idea of creating long-range, real-time connections between computers 
attracted a new type of researcher and engineer who – as the immediate 
beneficiary – was willing to investigate new possibilities for the development 
of network technology: 
 
“The idea of placing a call was not where these people were coming from. The 
people originally doing the ARPANET had a very different background. They 
tended to be people who were highly educated in things like operating 
systems and physics and astronomy and mathematics, so they were facing 
the problem without a lot of preconceived ideas about how networks had to 
work. For them, the whole point was ‘We're trying to collaborate on this set of 
physics standards, how about we arrange the communications around us that 
we are most likely to do what we need to do?’”(L.C.) 
 
In the telephony world, the telephone call is the point of departure for the 
development of any communications network. Within this paradigm, data 
transfer between computers represents an exceptional case. The ARPANET 
and the Internet, by contrast, were developed in the computer centres of 
American universities, and their creation was based on the idea of seeing 
what would happen if exception were to become the rule. 
 
The groundbreakers for the theory behind the architecture of the ARPANET 
were two scientists, who – independently of each other – had begun to 
develop new transmission procedures in the 1960s. In the mid-1960s, British 
computer scientist Donald Davies conceived of a method based on the same 
principle as the time-sharing system which would enable cheaper forms of 
data transmission in the commercial world. The American scientist, Paul 
Baran, by contrast, had been working since the late 1950s on military 
                                                 
5 For more details on time-sharing as the model for communication between computers, cf. Hellige 
1996. 
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network architectures which would be able to withstand enemy attacks. While 
Davies’ work focused on the civilian aim of interactive computing between 
enterprises, Baran was mainly interested in the survivability of 
communications networks. (for further details, cf. Hafner/Lyon 1996; Abbate 
1999) Interestingly, despite the different objectives, the two researchers 
happened upon the same transmission procedure and, significantly, their 
ideas were also given a similar reception. 
 
Davies’ approach was centred on the principle of “packet-switching”, whose 
main features are well known from postal and telegraph systems: Instead of 
transporting each message separately from the sender to the recipient, all 
the persons communicating share one transport path. The data flows, broken 
down into individual packets, all travel through the network together.6 
 
Baran’s ideas were mainly focused on the structure of communications 
networks. His argument against the design axioms of the telephone world 
was that survivability could be achieved if the hierarchical structure of 
telephone networks were abandoned in favour of a distributed and redundant 
system of loosely connected network nodes. If control over the data flow 
were distributed across numerous independent nodes, partial breakdowns in 
the network could be compensated for by new routes between the remaining 
nodes. 
 
Seen from the military point of view, the packet-switching approach seemed 
to promise better survivability. From the business point of view, the method 
opened up the possibility of more efficient, and thus more economical, 
utilisation of transmission capacity. Seen from the perspective of the 
telephony world, however, packet-switching violated all the quality standards 
and organisational principles on which speech transmission was based. 
Consequently, there was massive political opposition to Davies’ and Baran’s 
attempts to convince the telephony community of the expediency of practical 
field tests: 
 
“Vulnerability notwithstanding, the idea of slicing data into message blocks 
and sending each block out to find its own way through a matrix of phone lines 
struck AT&T staff members as totally preposterous. (...) AT&T officials 
concluded that Baran didn't have the first notion of how the telephone system 
worked … ‘So here some idiot comes along and talks about something being 
very simple, who obviously does not understand how the system works.’” 
(Hafner/Lyon 1996, pp. 62-63; Roberts 1978) 
                                                 
6 While telephone networks reserve a separate frequency for each data transmission between sender 
and recipient, in packet-switching systems the available bandwidth is divided up into portions of 
time. All the users then have access to the entire bandwidth and are alternately allocated “time 
slots” for transmitting data. The result is more efficient use of the network’s capacity if the 
applications are not time critical. In the case of time-critical speech transmission, by contrast, 
reserved frequencies are the better option. 
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In the end, the “idiotic” idea of packet-switching was first picked up and put 
into practice on a larger scale by ARPA (Advanced Research Projects 
Agency), a U.S. Department of Defense research institute. Despite the 
objections of the “communications professionals” within its own ranks, too, 
ARPA launched and maintained the ARPANET as an experimental research 
network. One of the protagonists, Bob Metcalfe, tells the story like this: “Many 
web generations ago, the ARPA knights started a revolution against the telco 
circuit-switching empire and determined to destroy the death stars and their 
twisted pairs …” (cited at [http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/reagle/inet-
quotations-19990709.html]). 
 
The choice in favour of the risky packet-switching system was ultimately 
decided by its similarity to the concepts behind the design of computer 
operating systems. (Kleinrock 1978; Helmers 1996) The Internet’s pioneers 
were well aware of the affinity between computer culture and packet-
switching technology: “Thus it remained for outsiders to the communications 
industry, computer professionals, to develop packet switching in response to 
a problem for which they needed a better answer: communicating data to and 
from computers.” (Roberts 1978, p. 1307) 
 
However, ARPA was not the only organisation working on communications 
networks for data transmission. Computer manufacturers, in particular, but 
increasingly also telephone companies, worked on the development of data 
networks in the 1970s (cf. Werle 1990). Among the network architectures that 
these efforts produced, the ARPANET/Internet and the telephone companies’ 
public data networks came to symbolise competing network philosophies. 
 10
3. The monkeys’ choice: Stupid networks and intelligent networks  
 
-+-+-+-+-+-   CHIMP     -+-+-+-+-+- 
| SIMIAN/ | ----------> *         * 
| MONKEY  |             *   ZOO   * 
|         | <---------- *         * 
-+-+-+-+-+-    KEEPER   -+-+-+-+-+- 
               /    \ 
              /      \ 
   IAMB-PENT /        \ PAN 
            /          \ 
           V            V 
    -+-+-+-+-+-     -+-+-+-+-+- 
    *         *     *         * 
    *  BARD   *     *  CRITIC * 
    *         *     *         * 
    -+-+-+-+-+-     -+-+-+-+-+- 
RFC 2795 
 
Around the mid-1970s, the telephone companies began developing 
international standards for a public data network.7 Driven by the market 
power of networks owned by their manufacturers, in particular IBM, the 
telephone companies set about introducing a standard public data network 
which would force computer manufacturers to provide compatible products 
(Abbate 1995). The result was X.25, the network architecture selected in 
1976 and introduced in some European countries in the subsequent years. 
X.25 was based on the assumption that all the computers in a country would 
eventually be linked together via a centralised data network. The parallel 
existence of the many manufacturer-specific networks that had already been 
widely introduced in the 1970s was considered an awkward, but 
surmountable, temporary problem. Thus, X.25 took the usual “strictly uniform 
technology” stance in dealing with connections between private and public 
data networks (Werle 1990), and its technology largely did not accommodate 
what was considered a fringe phenomenon. 
 
The advantage of a standardised data network for public network operators 
was obvious. Control over the network’s operation would remain in the hands 
of a single organisation, which would also be free to draw up binding norms 
                                                 
7 There are two official international institutions that deal with the development or standardisation 
of communications networks. The national telephone companies are organised in the Committee 
on International Telegraphy and Telephony (CCITT), a subdivision of the International 
Telecommunication Union (ITU), which is a UN organisation (cf. Genschel 1995). In a parallel 
capacity, the International Standards Organization (ISO) also deals with communications 
standards. The ISO has traditionally been a gathering point for manufacturers rather than operating 
companies. 
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for manufacturers and users. The idea of an independent data network 
administered by national postal authorities conformed perfectly to the 
telephone network’s technical and administrative history: “The PTT’s model 
was the telephone system, and they assumed that their monopoly on 
telecommunications would allow them to create a single, homogeneous 
public data network in each country.” (Abbate 1999, p. 162) 
 
The conditions facing those hoping to implement the ARPANET were very 
different. On the one hand, various computer centres first had to be 
persuaded to participate in a practical field experiment in packet-switching 
networking. On the other, the technical conditions varied across the different 
testing sites. The higher the number of universities communicating via the 
ARPANET, the more varied was the range of local networks that somehow 
had to be integrated in a common framework. As a result, local heterogeneity 
became one of the initial assumptions that flowed into the design of the 
ARPANET. Its creators assumed that both the locally operated university 
networks and the applications the ARPANET would have to support would be 
diverse. The common aim running through the development of the ARPANET 
and the Internet, therefore, was to develop a network architecture which was 
as undemanding and as neutral as possible both with respect to the physical 
infrastructure of the network and the ways in which it would be used: 
“Basically, reducing things to the smallest common denominator and coming 
up with ways of reading packets that were highly resilient in the face of 
failure. Regardless of what kind of technology you wanted to promote (…) 
you created the highest opportunity for packets to reach their destination.” 
(L.C.)8 
 
Another difference between the two types of network architecture, still 
disputed amongst engineers today, concerns control over the data flow. At 
first glance, this argument seems to be about finding the best possible 
method for ensuring the quality of transmission. Who or, more precisely, 
which authority will assume the responsibility that (the data) connections 
really take place? X.25, following the telephone network model, located data-
flow control in the network itself – at the switching centres. This would mean 
that a network’s operation is controlled by its administrators. The telephone 
companies’ argument in favour of this solution is that it is the only way they 
can give their customers the guarantee they expect that the service is of high 
quality. 
 
The Internet’s creators, by contrast, consciously avoided locating control 
functions in the network itself. Instead, TCP/IP delegates this function to the 
computers of the users communicating via the Internet. The so-called “end-
                                                 
8 The Internet Protocol IP – the technical core of the Internet – accomplishes the principle of the 
smallest common denominator by limiting itself to the role of a virtual network linking up 
autonomous networks. IP defines the rules governing communication between local networks (cf. 
Helmers et al. 2000). 
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to-end” principle stands for a division of labour between the network and the 
network nodes, which reduces the network’s contribution to a minimum and 
instead hands the responsibility for error control over to the applications 
running on individual computers. “Keep it simple, stupid” is the rule of thumb. 
 
The reason for this decentralised or distributed design philosophy is not only 
rooted in the Internet’s military background. The fact that a “stupid network” 
(Isenberg 1997;9 Hofmann 1999) significantly increases the scope for 
development and the flexibility of the users plays an equally important role. 
The more modest the range of functions carried out by the network, the more 
comprehensive is the individual user’s autonomy to act or communicate and 
the more flexibly the network can integrate new applications: 
 
“… building complex function into a network implicitly optimizes the network 
for one set of uses while substantially increasing the cost of a set of potentially 
valuable uses that may be unknown or unpredictable at design time. A case in 
point: had the original Internet design been optimized for telephony-style 
virtual circuits (…), it would never have enabled the experimentation that led to 
protocols that could support the World Wide Web …” (Reed et al. 1998, p. 2).  
 
Because the first users of the network were also its creators, they were able 
to create scope for development in their architecture that they would never 
have been given by third parties. The most important quality of the “stupid 
network” is probably the fact that it avoids making prior assumptions about 
the way it will be used in the future. The liberal nature of the end-to-end 
principle is the technical prerequisite for the possibility its users have to 
integrate as many services and applications as they want in the Internet right 
up to the present day. At the same time, the stupid network is the greatest 
obstacle to all well-meant attempts at political regulation of content: “The Net 
interprets censorship as damage and routes around it.” (John Gilmore)10 
 
The relatively large degree of autonomy granted to the users also has a 
dimension related to property rights, however. Because both the ARPANET 
and the Internet were developed by research institutes for research institutes 
on the basis of state funds, public access to the network architecture was a 
central concern. The technical specifications were published and released for 
general use.11 The non-proprietary character of the network technology is 
what distinguishes the Internet from all the communications networks in the 
telephony world. Unlike the latter, the academic world’s understanding of a 
public data network neither provided for controlled access nor did it include a 
tariff system. The end-to-end principle and the network architecture’s free 
                                                 
9 This essay written by a former AT&T employee about the weaknesses of intelligent (telephone) 
network architectures attracted the disapproval of his former employer (cf. 
[http://www.isen.com/stupid.html]). 
10 http://www.toad.com/gnu/ 
11 Only the infrastructure of the network, known as the backbones, was reserved for use by research 
institutes until the privatisation of the Internet in 1995. 
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source code, both typical examples of accidental excellence, each 
strengthened each other’s unforeseeable effect. Together they are creating a 
public communication space which is largely shaped by its users: 
 
“... the end-to-end principle of the Internet is based in the common resource of 
TCP/IP. This is the logical layer of the Internet. It is not owned by anyone. It is 
a free resource, like the air. It is not consumed by use. My use of it does not 
deprive you of your use of it. It is therefore not subject to the tragedy of the 
commons: overgrazing. It allows me to launch a product on the net and not 
have to ask a telco, a broadcaster, a regulator, Disney or Time Warner for 
permission. (...) The Internet, by freeing the logical layer from private owner-
ship, permitted enormous technical and service innovation.” (Timothy M. 
Denton, from a mail sent on 27.03.01 to the Cybertelecom mailing list; also cf. 
Lemley/Lessig 1999). 
4. At the nodes of the network – J. Random Hacker: “Just playing 
    with the software …” 
 
Dilbert writes a poem and presents it to Dogbert: 
DOGBERT: I once read that given infinite time, 
a thousand monkeys with typewriters would 
eventually write the complete works of 
Shakespeare. 
DILBERT: But what about my poem?  
DOGBERT: Three monkeys, ten minutes. 
Scott Adams 
 
The ARPANET was not the only network project of the 1960s based on the 
concept of time-sharing, which sought to use remote data transmission to 
also provide geographically distant users with access to the capacity of high-
performance computers. The primary objective was balanced utilisation of 
resources; exchange of information and interaction between individuals was 
only a negligible consideration, for the computer was seen more as a tool 
and machine than as a medium. But once the network was up and running, 
this relationship was soon turned on its head and hardware- and program-
sharing took a back seat to informal communications between the 
researchers involved in the project. After the first e-mails were exchanged 
between two ARPANET nodes in 1972, by 1973 electronic mail already 
accounted for three quarters of the data flowing through the network. 
(Hafner/Lyon 1996, p. 194) 
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“The ARPANET was not intended as a message system. In the minds of its 
inventors, the network was intended for resource-sharing, period. (...) But 
once the first couple of dozen nodes were installed, early users turned the 
system of linked computers into a personal as well as a professional 
communications tool. Using the ARPANET as a sophisticated mail system 
was simply a good hack.” (Hafner/Lyon 1996, p. 189) 
 
The decentralised and open architecture of the ARPANET and later the 
Internet granted its users a scope for creativity which gave birth not only to 
electronic mail but also to a host of other services and applications. Internet 
Relay Chat (IRC), the virtual playgrounds of MUDs (Multi-User Dungeons) 
and even the World Wide Web are ultimately achievements that are best 
characterised as “a good hack”. These applications were not invented and 
designed by developers for users who were looking for innovative and 
commercially viable technologies and products, but by developers as users. 
The innovative milieu of open data networks is very substantially shaped by 
the hacker community, which is not given the designation as a professional 
culture it deserves. 
 
The hacker culture combines technical virtuosity, a sense of aesthetics which 
tends towards the nonsensical, and a pronounced tolerance for things which 
would be considered extraordinary in the real world with the desire to be 
someone special, all of which culminates in an all-embracing lifestyle with the 
computer at its centre. The hacker culture has developed its own rules and 
rituals, heroes and rogues, modes of thought and behaviour, sub-cultures, 
and a language which is only barely comprehensible to outsiders.12 Hackers 
are considered outsiders by others and generally see themselves as an elite. 
The way they apply their technical skills is more similar to an artist playing 
with his material than to an engineer pursuing a specific goal. The work of art 
they hope will make them famous is known as their “hack”, while “to hack” is: 
“To interact with a computer in a playful and exploratory rather than goal-
directed way. ‘Whatcha up to?’ ‘Oh, just hacking.’”13 
 
The hacker culture and what it does cannot be narrowed down to a specific 
programming environment or specific programming tools. However, as 
regards the innovations emerging from the nodes of the network since the 
birth of the Internet, the UNIX operating system, in particular, has achieved a 
significance as a local programming environment which can hardly be 
exaggerated. Without UNIX, the Internet would not exist in the form it does 
today. One of the ironies of Internet history is the fact that the development of 
UNIX began at AT&T Bell Labs. Bell Labs employed their own computer 
scientists who worked on developing operating systems for the company 
                                                 
12 On hacker culture cf. Helmers 1996; Helmers/Haase 1998; and Turkle 1984, pp. 241-293. For a 
compendium of hacker slang and hacker folklore, cf. The Jargon File 2000. 
13  [http://www.elsewhere.org/jargon/html/entry/hack.html]. 
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computer centre. The quest for an interactive operating system for on-site 
time-sharing resulted in UNIX, and a familiar pattern had once again been 
repeated: Hackers created a toolkit fashioned according to their own needs 
and problems which any skilled user who was interested was free to use and 
extend with his or her own contributions. 
 
“UNIX is unique in that it wasn't designed as a commercial operating system 
meant to run application programs, but as a hacker’s toolset, by and for 
programmers. (…) When Ken Thompson and Dennis Ritchie first wrote UNIX 
at AT&T Bell Labs, it was for their own use, and for their friends and co-
workers. Utility Programs were added by various people as they had problems 
to solve.” (Peek et al. 1997, p. 1) 
 
“UNIX was (...) treated by the Bell system as ‘Oh, just something we happen 
to do for our own internal use. You can have a copy if you want, but if you got 
problems, don't bother us.’” (Henry Spencer, cited in Hauben/Hauben 1997, p. 
140) 
 
In the computer science faculties of the universities where the UNIX 
operating system quickly gained a foothold, generation after generation of 
computer science students had to do battle with UNIX’s source code. This 
turned academic institutions into UNIX development centres. One of the most 
important was the University of California at Berkeley, which provided the 
world-wide academic computer community with Berkeley UNIX for free. It 
was at Berkeley that a UNIX version (4.2 BSD) was written with ARPA’s 
support in the early 1980s in which the ARPANET communications protocol 
TCP/IP was already “built in”. This meant that an operating system capable 
of networking was now available, and commercial workstations were also 
equipped with it from 1983 onwards. 
 
“The first Sun machines were shipped with the Berkeley version of UNIX, 
complete with TCP/IP. When Sun included network software as part of every 
machine it sold and didn't charge separately for it, networking exploded.” 
(Hafner/Lyon 1996, p. 250) 
 
As UNIX computers equipped with TCP/IP spread through universities, 
telephone companies and (computer) firms, an expanding group of potential 
Internet hosts and users developed outside the ARPANET research 
community. From 1983 onwards, TCP/IP became the only binding protocol 
on the ARPANET itself. Chance had taken on a tangible form. 
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5. Regulating the new medium: Controlling the content of Usenet 
 
Come to think of it, there are already a million 
monkeys on a million typewriters, and Usenet is 
NOTHING like Shakespeare. 
Blair Houghton 
 
Alongside the Internet, a host of what were known as grassroots networks14 
also emerged in the late 1970s and early 1980s. One of these was Usenet. 
Usenet was developed in autumn 1979 on the east coast of the United States 
as a hack by three computer science students who created a 
communications service for a new version of the UNIX operating system. 
“We wanted something different in Seventh Edition [of the UNIX operating 
system] when the Code changed.” (S.B.) 
 
Their program used the UUCP (Unix-to-Unix copy) transmission procedure 
for sending messages to subject-specific newsgroups. The initial transport 
medium for the “News” was the telephone network. With the help of modems, 
the messages were exchanged at regular intervals between the sites 
involved in the form of compressed data packets. The possibility of 
transmitting data using UUCP, which had been developed at AT&T Bell Labs 
and had been a standard component of UNIX since 1978, had already given 
the UNIX community e-mail, originally called “network mail”. Now, thanks to 
Usenet, they had a “network news” service as well. 
 
Initially, grassroots networks like Usenet often grew more rapidly than the 
ARPANET because there were no restrictions on access. The ARPANET 
had 113 network nodes in 1983, compared to 600 Usenet sites (Hafner/Lyon 
1996, p. 249; Gene Spafford, cited in Hauben/Hauben 1997, p. 44). TCP/IP 
connections later increasingly replaced UUCP as the traditional transport 
medium for the News and, as the years passed, Usenet became one of the 
most popular communications services on the Internet. It is thus no 
coincidence that it has often played a prominent role in battles against 
institutional and state efforts to tame the Net.15 
 
                                                 
14 On grassroots networks cf. Abbate 1999, pp. 200–205, and Rheingold 1993, pp. 110–144. 
15 Some readers may remember how, at the end of 1995, Bavarian law enforcement authorities 
instructed a commercial online service to block its subscribers’ access to certain Usenet 
newsgroups, which led to an international wave of protest on the Net. In the United States, Usenet, 
with its allegedly primarily pornographic content, provided substantial legal advice during the 
controversy about the “Communications Decency Act”, which was passed by the Senate in June 
1995 and later deemed unconstitutional by the Supreme Court and revoked. 
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From the moment of its conception, Usenet shared the same decentralised 
network philosophy that underlies the Internet. To the exclusion of any 
institutional authority, responsibility for drawing up the constitutive rules for 
Usenet use was left to its day-to-day operation and its users (cf. Hoffmann 
2000 for more detail). The autonomy of the individual network nodes and 
their administrators was of primary importance: “Every administrator controls 
his own site. No one has any real control over any site but his own.” (Moraes 
1999) A network of this kind is the ideal medium for a culture of mavericks 
who maintain a close web of relationships within their own world and in the 
process grant each other huge leeway. 
 
Written guidelines for behaviour first appeared on Usenet in 1983 in the form 
of “Netiquette” (Djordjevic 1998, p. 17). The history of debates about how to 
deal with unwanted content, or that which is considered harmful, is as old as 
the Net itself. Controversy about which types of communication should be 
permitted or excluded and which strategic approaches to regulation of 
content seemed legitimate was certainly never forced on the Net by 
“external” intervention – despite the declared principle of “free flow of 
information”. The following three examples illustrate different solutions which 
have been proposed in the quest for rules and practical ways to regulate an 
open and decentralised network. 
5.1“… putting the bad stuff in one place” 
The News was still extremely small in 1981, consisting of an average of only 
20 articles per day (Hauben/Hauben 1997, p. 44). Messages which were not 
to everyone’s taste thus stood out all the more. The first bone of contention 
turned out to be dirty jokes. According to one eye witness: 
 
“The very first flap over that sort of stuff happened in 1981. We had a group, 
net.jokes – I guess I’ve always been involved in that. And net.jokes had some 
dirty jokes in it. Someone said, ‘Well, you know, not everyone wants to read 
these dirty jokes and we want to sort of divide it out. So let’s make a 
newsgroup for just the dirty jokes and jokes in bad taste. We’ll just call it 
net.jokes.q, which means <questionable taste>; and if you know, you know; 
but if you don’t know, we’re not advertising that here’s where to go to find 
jokes in questionable taste.’” (B.T.) 
 
The creation of a new group by partitioning the content of the old group 
seemed an elegant solution at first. By giving the objectionable messages 
their own forum, the friction in the original group was reduced without any 
need to resort to censorious intervention. However, a serious disadvantage 
soon emerged: Not everyone immediately realised what was hidden behind 
the name net.jokes.q: 
 
“The downside was that people could subscribe to net.jokes.q, then, and not 
know what they were getting into. The story went that someone’s secretary at 
a company on the net had subscribed to net.jokes.q and had read some really 
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sick joke. Then it had come to the attention of people in the company that 
there was this newsgroup full of sick jokes, and why were we doing this? They 
shut down their feed because of that.” (B.T.) 
 
After the selection and concentration of questionable content had turned out 
to be a double-edged sword, the new group was discontinued and the 
Usenet community learned an important lesson: The preferences of 
computer nerds are not necessarily appreciated by all the other users. 
 
“People decided that it was a mistake putting the bad stuff in one place. Only, 
unfortunately, us techno-nerds think that’s a good solution. We think, ‘Well, 
clearly, we’ve put it in one place so now you can select whether you get it or 
not.’ But the truth is, what it means is that if you put all the bad stuff in one 
place, you concentrate it, and those who would be bothered by it don’t at all 
get impressed at the fact that you’ve gone to this effort to make sure that they 
can turn it off; they just come and they see it all in one place and they take 
offence, and it just drives people wilder. So net.jokes.q was probably the first 
group to be deleted, that I know of. And it was deleted because people 
realized, ‘If we put it all in one place, it just causes more problems, not less. 
Better to take the offensive jokes, mix them in with the rest and say, <This is 
the real world. There’s dirty jokes and there’s – well, there aren’t that many 
clean jokes – but there’s some clean jokes. You get them all together and it’s 
part of the ordinary world.>’” (B.T.) 
5.2 Kill files 
As Usenet expanded, the problem of objectionable content was soon 
overshadowed by the question as to how individual users could handle the 
growing number of messages sent daily. The problem was no longer just the 
selection of specific content, but the general issue of selection by individual 
users. The options open to Usenet users depend primarily on the functions 
offered by their newsreaders. These programs are used to download the 
desired newsgroups from one of the Usenet sites, to browse through the 
News, to read individual articles and to send other articles. In 1984, when 
Usenet counted around 900 sites and over 200 articles a day, a newsreader 
software which included a filtering option known as “kill files” appeared. The 
author of the newsreader recalls: 
 
“I invented the kill files. It was partly because there was too much and partly 
because even back then there were people on whose articles people wanted 
to avoid reading. There were flame wars from the beginning and so people 
would get mad enough at somebody or would just get tired of reading them 
and they wanted to have some way of saying ‘I just don't want to read 
anything by this person anymore.’ So I put in kill files and they were very 
warmly received. Basically it took people up to another level being able to stay 
reading their interesting newsgroups without having to give up on them 
because there was just too much stuff.” (L.W.) 
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Kill files are lists of names and words compiled by the users. The newsreader 
searches through all the new articles and, when displaying the contents of a 
newsgroup on the computer screen, automatically filters out those messages 
that contain the specified terms. In later versions the filter options allowed not 
only negative, but also positive selection. 
 
“Eventually the kill files were refined to where you could not only select things 
that you didn't want to read but also say by default, ‘I don't want to read stuff 
but show me stuff made by such and such an author or that contains such and 
such a keyword.’ That was all based on regular expressions so it was very 
powerful. For many years I ran a filter of my own on news, mostly to find 
things I was interested in, in newsgroups I don't read, rather than the other 
way around. I had a rule file that was 50 or 70 rules for things you might be 
interested in. Up until a year ago I was pretty famous for being one of the 
people who did that, what do they call it? Kibozing was one name for it, after 
Kibo, you know Kibo, he did that. I sort of invented it about the same time but 
he got famous for it.” (L.W.) 
 
Kill files proved to be a success and Usenet users still happily implement 
them. Not only do kill files increase the user’s range of options, but they also 
reinforce the network policy concept of complete local control at the receiver 
end. 
 
“I think kill files contributed to the notion of local control over the news. They 
also contributed to the notion that Usenet itself is an amoral medium, it should 
not be trying to enforce standards of any sort, however you want to define 
them. Rather it's just the ground of all being and you propagate the stuff all 
over and then each individual site can control what it gets. You can control 
what you see if your newsreader is smart enough. There have always been 
these grand proposals for how to control the network, how to fix this or fix that 
from the beginning. And most of them fall down because they require the co-
operation of more people than are willing to co-operate.” (L.W.) 
5.3 Recipes, drugs and Rock n´ Roll 
In 1986, there were around 2,500 Usenet sites exchanging an average of 
500 articles daily. The growing volume of news led to one of the few cases of 
organised change on Usenet. The administrators of a number of larger sites 
got together in order to restructure the name space on Usenet. This group, 
known as the “Backbone Cabal”, agreed to replace the original single-level 
name space with several hierarchies, so that the individual newsgroups could 
be classified under several higher-level subject areas. Thus, newsgroups 
dealing with leisure-time activities, for example, were to be grouped in the rec 
(recreational) hierarchy, while groups dealing with computer technology 
would be placed in the comp hierarchy. This rearrangement would allow the 
administrators of the individual sites to make a pre-selection at the hierarchy 
level when receiving the News. 
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The reorganisation of Usenet name space (“The Great Renaming”) was in 
fact carried out as planned, and was accompanied by numerous skirmishes 
about the renaming of individual newsgroups. For example, the mod.recipes 
group, whose members exchanged cooking recipes, was to be renamed 
rec.food.recipes, much to the chagrin of the group’s moderator. Another 
News administrator was annoyed by the Backbone Cabal’s refusal to set up 
a group called rec.drugs. Against this background, the two administrators 
created an alternative distribution channel which was independent of the 
Backbone sites – the “alt.net”. 
 
“The famous barbecue at which the alt net was created was held at G.T.’s 
Sunset Barbecue in Mountain View / California on May 7, 1987. John Gilmore 
and I were both unhappy with the decision making process of the ‘ordinary’ 
net. John was distressed because they wouldn't create rec.drugs, and I was 
distressed because they wanted to force me to adopt the name 
‘rec.food.recipes’ for my recipe newsgroup. Gordon Moffett of Amdahl also sat 
with us. (...) We set up a link between us, (...) and we vowed to pass all alt 
traffic to each other and to nurse the net along. By the end of May the groups 
alt.test, alt.config, alt.drugs, and alt.gourmand were active.” (Brian Reid, cited 
in Hardy 1993) 
 
On the alt net, also known as the “alternative backbone”, any user is entirely 
free to create a newsgroup on a self-chosen subject under whichever name 
he or she desires. The newsgroups on the alt net were soon integrated into 
Usenet under the alt hierarchy and were surprisingly successful. 
 
“My machine was sort of the center of the alt backbone, and it stayed that way 
for more than a year. I think we never got propagation in that time to more 
than about 40% of the Usenet, which was a little bit of a disappointment, but 
fine. But then something happened that changed all of that. Brian Reid for 
some reason created alt.sex and then, simultaneously alt.rock&roll. Alt.sex 
turned out to be a very popular topic. Within six months of the creation of 
alt.sex and a couple of its subgroups, we had propagation to like 80 or 90% of 
the Usenet.” (J.G.) 
 
The establishment of the alt groups on Usenet showed its creators that there 
was only a loose coupling between Usenet software and the social structures 
of network organisation. The software allowed a different control regime to 
exist in each of the Usenet hierarchies – eventually all under the one roof. 
 
“The central insight of all was that the software existed independently of the 
social structures around it, and that we could use the same software with an 
explicitly different set of social structures and social conventions, and that 
would be okay. There was almost no technical hacking involved. It was just a 
social hack.” (J.G.) 
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6. “Nobody is close enough to affect everything …” 
 
KEEPER Message Request Codes (ZOO-to-SIMIAN): 
CODE  NAME         DESCRIPTION 
+--------------------------------------------------+ 
| 0 | RESERVED   | Reserved                      | 
+--------------------------------------------------+ 
| 1 | STATUS     | Determine status of monkey    | 
+--------------------------------------------------+ 
| 2 | HEARTBEAT  | Check to see if monkey has a  | 
                   heartbeat                     | 
+--------------------------------------------------+ 
| 3 | WAKEUP     | Wake up monkey                | 
+--------------------------------------------------+ 
| 4 | TYPE       | Make sure monkey is typing    | 
+--------------------------------------------------+ 
| 5 | FASTER     | Monkey must type faster       | 
+--------------------------------------------------+ 
| 6 | TRANSCRIPT | Send transcript               | 
+--------------------------------------------------+ 
| 7 | STOP       | Stop all monkey business      | 
+--------------------------------------------------+ 
RFC 2795 
 
History repeats itself on the Internet, too. The same self-regulation measures 
that have been discussed since the early days of Usenet can now also be 
seen on the World Wide Web. Once again, there is an attempt to differentiate 
between the ethically reprehensible and the socially acceptable, and if the 
former cannot be disposed of entirely, then one tries to at least create a 
separate compartment for generally undesirable content. A current example 
is the proposal – rejected to date – to create separate name zones for 
children (.kids) and for pornography (.xxx). 
 
In addition to the proposals, the arguments are also repeating themselves. 
Which software would be secure enough to block specific user groups’ 
access to Internet content which is freely accessible to others? And, more 
importantly, which Internet authority would have enough legitimacy and 
power to ensure that all the content really does end up in the same 
compartment? Would the so culturally and politically heterogeneous Netizens 
even accept such an authority? Would one not have to expect that the 
undesired side-effects of technical or administrative forms of centralised 
Internet regulation would greatly outnumber the advantages? 
 
The Internet’s creators fought and won (at least for the present) the battle 
against the telephone companies for control over cyberspace on technical 
ground. Hence they are relaxed about efforts towards hierarchical regulation 
of the network’s distributed operation: “Because it's global, nobody is close 
enough to affect everything.... I think [policy folks] are going to have a lot of 
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trouble internalizing the fact that just because they want it really bad and 
because they write it down, it doesn't make it sell.” (M.D.) 
 
The consequence of the forms of local control that are dominant on the 
Internet is by no means total lawlessness. But every innovation and every 
effort seeking translocal coordination requires the active agreement of every 
single site. The decentralised architecture which makes the network immune 
to censorious interventions in data flow does not guarantee “free flow of 
information” for all eternity. The cooperative anarchy of the Internet is not 
primarily the expression of an ethic of tolerance in the name of freedom of 
information, but of a pragmatic awareness of the limits of the participants’ will 
to cooperate. 
 
And so our provisional answer to the question as to whether the flow of 
communication will now be governed by the network operators or the users is 
this: By neither. It could also, more often than one thinks, turn out to be a 
matter of chance. 
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